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Property Distribution Physics:
The Talisman of Time and
Middle Class Law
MARGARET F. BRINIG*
I. Introduction
Should the young professional's spouse get some share in a newly
acquired career while the young military officer's will not? Does the
division between alimony and property make any sense, given no-fault
divorce? Is reimbursement for lost career opportunities plus a share
in the couple's tangible property fair compensation for a divorcing
spouse? Such difficult questions frame this piece, which will also-
and I believe necessarily-digress into the nature of marriage, the duties
of parenting, and modern divorce philosophy.
I begin this rather ambitious undertaking by reporting a class discus-
sion. Early last fall, a student in my family law class asked whether
family law is best rationalized from a middle-class American's perspec-
tive. When I reached the topic of equitable distribution several weeks
later, I reminded the class about the question, and asked what Mahoney'
reveals about that bias, since professional degrees are only relevant
for upper middle class families.2 was attempting to set up a series of
* Professor of Law, George Mason University. I thank Alan E. Koczela and
Jana M. Singer for their thoughtful comments as well as research support from the
George Mason University School of Law.
1. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982). Mahoney is a principal
case in standard family law casebooks. See, e.g., CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET
F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW (1996); WALTER WADLINGTON, DOMESTIC
RELATIONS (2d ed. 1990).
2. The literature on professional degrees is quite voluminous. For articles written
before 1983, see sources cited in Haugan v. Haugan, 343 N.W.2d 796, 800 & n.3
(Wis. 1984).
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questions I would ask later that would extend the concept of Mahoney
to other and broader situations.' Contemporary family law understands
that alimony deals with claims on future earnings streams ,4 while prop-
erty division (at least as seen by divorce lawyers and perhaps law
reformers)5 deals with the past acquisition property that is typically
tangible.6 The legal distinctions may be relatively clear. Thus, for tax
treatment, alimony and property at least traditionally were quite distinct
categories. 7 Further, alimony, but not property division,8 is both modifi-
3. See, e.g., Piscopo v. Piscopo, 557 A.2d 1040 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1989); Golub v. Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Elkus v. Elkus,
572 N.Y.S.2d 901 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). These cases all involve career enhancement,
but not professional degrees.
4. Aufmuth v. Aufinuth, 152 Cal. Rptr. (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). For an extended
discussion of this principle, see Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice,
67 N.C. L. REv. 1103 (1985). See also Jane Rutherford, Duty in Divorce: Shared
Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 539 (1990).
5. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION
(Tentative Draft May 1996) [hereinafter ALl Tentative Draft]. Section 4.07 provides:
(1) "Spousal earning capacity, spousal skills, and post-dissolution spousal labor are
not property divisible on divorce." Consistent with this interpretation, section 2 pro-
vides that occupational licenses and educational degrees are not property divisible on
divorce. "The principle underlying this difference [between alimony and property] is
that marriage creates property entitlements to certain things acquired during it, but
does not create property entitlements against the person of the other spouse." Id. at
173, cmt. a.
6. Bussewitz v. Bussewitz, 248 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Wis. 1977) (marital estate
consists of the "assets of the parties as they exist at the time of the divorce"). An
exception is for goodwill. See ALI Tentative Draft, supra note 5, § 4.07(3)(b); Dugan
v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1, 9 (N.J. 1983). See generally Grace Blumberg, Marital Property
Treatment of Pensions, Disability Pay, Workmen's Comp, and Other Wage Substi-
tutes: An Insurance, or Replacement, Analysis, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1250, 1260-64
(1986); THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROP-
ERTY 7-69 (1991). Another exception is for pensions. See ALI Tentative Draft, §
4.08(1); Moore v. Moore, 553 A.2d 20 (N.J. 1989).
7. Section 71 of the IRC makes alimony deductible by the payor and taxable to
the payee. I.R.C. § 71 (1995). Property distribution caused a capital gain to accrue
to the spouse who originally owned it, while the recipient received the property at its
new basis, U.S. v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), until the Domestic Relations Tax
Reform Act of 1984 provided that it should be treated for income tax purposes as a
gift (not a taxable event; recipient retains old basis). I.R.C. § 1041 (1995).
8. See ALI Tentative Draft, supra note 5, § 4.07:
"Earning capacity" has no meaning or existence independent of the method used
to measure it. It is generally measured by finding a present value for all or some
part of the individual's future earnings, and is thus no more than a shorthand
term for that present value. A rule characterizing earning capacity as marital
property is a rule treating future earnings as marital property, which in operation
requires that those earnings be estimated at divorce so that their present value
can then be fixed and allocated between the spouses.
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able and the subject of contempt enforcement. 9 Despite these legal
differences, the economist sees no real distinction between the various
forms of financial allocation. The bridging concept is that of human
capital, which was first popularized in the family law context by Joan
Krauskopf.'0
As the economist sees it, alimony "frozen" in time (the present) is
simply another form of property. (My faulty physics analogy is that
energy, confined to one place, is what we see as material objects.)
Thus finance models see stock prices reflecting the market's anticipation
of all future dividends and other appreciation." If a divorcing spouse
has any claim to joint property, it is worth thinking about why it can
only be a claim to the fixed share (or "stock") rather than the ongoing
stream (or "flow"). 2 The problem becomes particularly acute in cases
like Mahoney and in most modem marriages, where at the time of
9. Modification is discussed in ALl Tentative Draft, supra note 5, § 5.09, at
cmt. a ("Alimony awards, unlike the allocations at divorce of marital property, are
traditionally modifiable to reflect changes in the parties' circumstances that arise after
the initial decree is rendered."). For the difference in courts' enforcement powers,
see Picker v. Vollenhover, 290 P.2d 789 (Or. 1955).
10. Joan M. Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal
Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 KAN. L. REv. 379 (1980).
One persistent advocate of many of the themes I explore here, though holding some
different conclusions, is Allen Parkman. See, e.g., ALLEN M. PARKMAN, No FAULT
DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? (1992); Allen M. Parkman, Human Capital as Prop-
erty in Celebrity Divorces, 29 FAM. L.Q. 141 (1995). Gary Becker did the pioneering
work on human capital. GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (3d ed. 1993). See also
Singer, supra note 4, at 1115 (another view of how sharing of the marital assets might
be made more equal).
11. ROBERT C. POZEN, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROB-
LEMS IN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost
Explanations of Dividends, 74 AMER. EcON. REv. 650 (1984). See also Parkman,
supra note 10, at 146. The corporation might also be financed through debt (bonds),
with the stream of income interest as opposed to dividends. RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 371 (3d ed. 1988); Alan Schwartz, The Continuing
Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984). See generally Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FINAN. EcON. 305 (1976).
12. In contrast, the classic case of Graham v. Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo.
1978), noted that:
An educational degree, such as an M.B.A. is simply not encompassed even by
the broad views of the concept of "property." It does not have an exchange value
or any objective transferable value on an open market .... In our view, it has
none of the attributes of property in the usual sense of that term.
However, a professional license was recognized to be property in one state. O'Brien
v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985). See also Ciobanu v. Ciobanu, 409 S.E.2d
749, 751 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (spouse's contribution recognized as a contribution
to separate property).
96 Family Law Quarterly, Volume 31, Number 1, Spring 1997
divorce the most valuable things the spouses own are not their homes
or cars, but their future earning capacities. 3 Economist Allen Parkman
gives a partial answer to the question of why earning capacities are
not divided. In his No Fault Divorce: What Went Wrong?,14 he posits
that the portion of this human capital acquired during marriage is in
fact a small one: the business, medical, or law degree could not be
earned without substantial pre-marriage preparation and investment in
grade school through college. 15 As will be demonstrated presently, I
disagree with this portion of his analysis.
In class, I continued my discussion of property division by asking
why, given no-fault divorce, Mrs. Mahoney might reasonably expect
reimbursement. 16 In other words, why is Melvin Mahoney's enrichment
"unjust"? Why does she not have a duty to support him? My own
belief is she does, and therefore this particular case is not particularly
appealing on its facts. It is much easier to argue the principle when
the working spouse pays for the tuition or delays his or her education.
In Mahoney, Melvin's tuition was paid by the government.
To pick up on the Parkman point, I ask my class how much of the value
of Melvin's degree comes from investments prior to marriage (i.e., in
high school and college). As noted above, Parkman maintains the propor-
tion earned during marriage may be quite small. As an empirical matter,
law students, particularly those married to other professionals, feel there
really is something special going on that affects both spouses when one
obtains a professional degree. 17 The hours of preparation, the indignities
of being called on repeatedly in class, and the lack of any outside-school
"life" push law school far beyond the rigors of undergraduate or high
school studies. These add to the law student's stress and are part of his
or her unique investment. To the extent they affect the spouse as well,
they are part of the spouse's investment in the way that tolerating the
more relaxed undergraduate study can never be.
If we wish to look at career enhancements as a special investment,
we might reason as follows: 18 Suppose a builder always wanted to own
an apartment building. He read and studied apartment management
13. Thus, Lenore Weitzman calls future earnings the "diamonds" of marital prop-
erty. LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 109 (1985). They are "often
the most valuable assets a couple owns." Id. at 141.
14. See generally supra note 10.
15. See also Parkman, supra note 10, at 147.
16. In addition to Mahoney, see Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 489 A.2d 782 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1985) (compensation for financial support).
17. See id. (Weiland, J., concurring and dissenting) ("In a sense, the spouse who
contributes to the other's obtaining of a degree has made a marital investment.").
18. I acknowledge my intellectual debt to Alan Koczela, who argued this point
with me.
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before he married, but waited until marriage before building the prop-
erty largely with his own two hands. At divorce, the building and its
rental stream would be shared with his spouse, though the knowledge
of apartment management and construction was entirely acquired before
marriage. For a more contemporary example, consider Microsoft Cor-
poration's initial public stock offering. CEO Bill Gates could have gone
to the bank for a loan or issued debt (bonds) in the company. Instead,
he offered part ownership in the residual claims generated by the firm
(stock). He made this choice because he thought the benefits of "going
public" outweighed the costs. 9 If the initial public offering price were
$20 per share, could he later claim after the stock price climbed to
$100 per share that the stockholders "only provided financing for his
projects," while his vision for Windows 95 and all his other ideas were
completely formed before the public offering? Should the investors be
satisfied with the dividends they received while owning the stock, and
before Gates reneged? Clearly this would not seem any more fair than
Parkman's limitation does.
I wondered in class how much a "degreed spouse" like Melvin will
be stifled in future years if his degree (or professional license) is called
property and divided now. How do we know he will not die in three
years, and therefore not realize his expected income? 20 What I am
getting at is that expected value, used to award the present value of
Mr. Mahoney's degree, takes care, by definition, of the prognosis for
the average degree holder. 2' But is that the award a court should make
in a divorce case, or should it be concerned with this particular obligor
19. He might have made this decision because a mixture of debt and equity enables
the corporation to provide different risk-return packages to meet the varying preferences
of investors (lenders and stockholders). The expected return of bonds is less than that of
both unsecured creditors and stockholders. See POSNER, supra note 11, § 14.4 & n. 1.
20. There was a young lawyer, Daniel Huston, who was murdered outside a Wash-
ington-area nightclub recently. Arlo Wagner, Carijacking Death Stuns Victim's Friends
and Family, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1994, at A10. His alleged assailants were sen-
tenced in November of 1995. Brian Mooar, Two Men Sentenced to Life in Killing
Outside Club, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1995, at D1. Problems for degree division like
those posed by premature death are discussed in Haugan v. Haugan, 343 N.W.2d 796
(Wis. 1984).
21. The expected value of an (good) asset of P currently worth $100 is calculated
as follows:
Say we want to know its expected value in a year. There is an 80% probability
that it will have a normal rate of return, and be worth $110. There is a 10%
probability that it will do exceptionally well, and be worth $120, and a 10%
probability that it will do badly, and be worth only $105.
EV(P) = (.8 x $110) + (.1 x $120) + (.1 x $105) =
$88 + $12 + $10.50 = $110.50.
See JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR (1964).
98 Family Law Quarterly, Volume 31, Number 1, Spring 1997
who is bound in this way? If the court should be concerned with each
particular obligor as an individual, how can it obtain the information
necessary to calculate the individual degree's expected value? For ex-
ample, it may be relatively easy to judge the expected earnings of an
accountant. The variance is far greater for an exceptional athlete, who
may end her career after only a few years or make millions of dollars as
a professional.22 Each type of career enhancement probably is associated
with unique risk characteristics.23 It is the exceptional or extraordinary
earnings the spouse receives that provide the difference over, say, the
average spouse with a couple of years of college.24 If the projected
earnings are way off the mark by being much higher or lower, I will
argue later that the disappointed spouse should be able to modify the
remaining amounts to be paid.
I then asked my class a series of questions, some real, some hypotheti-
cal, about other investments in the spouse that might be covered by
the reasoning in Mahoney and the other degree cases. Should a spouse
be compensated for sacrifices made for an officer in the Armed Forces?
Would the rule be the same for an IBM executive's husband who has
had to move every few years?
25
Last fall my class included several wives of servicemen and a couple
of married servicemen. The wives were quite vocal about their own
experiences in moving around the world with their mates, about their
not being able to hold meaningful jobs, and about their continual enter-
taining to support career advancement. The class seemed to suddenly
grasp how all spouses sacrifice and invest in each other, so that confining
compensation only to degree cases like Mahoney seems less than fair.
On the other hand, New York has had real problems as I see it dealing
with a kind of commercialization of marriage that is set in the reported
cases following O'Brien. I am thinking in particular of one case where
a doctor and lawyer, I believe, had each put the other through school
22. In class, I have long used the example of sports personality Joe Theisman,
who was a college quarterback at the time of his first marriage.
23. The lawyer arguing for a share of enhanced earnings could obtain statistics
on the percentage of people certified for a particular career that lose their certification
or otherwise cease to use the enhancement prior to normal retirement age.
24. Recent data from Connecticut indicate that the average education of divorcing
wives from 1993-95 was 13.218 years and for their husbands was 13.076 years. CONN.
DEP'T OF PUBLIC HEALTH, OFF. OF POLICY, PLANNING AND EVALUATION (1993-95)
(electronic data available from author; maximum years recorded was 17 for all post-
college work).
25. Cases I use in class include Piscopo v. Piscopo, 557 A.2d 1040 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1989) (comedian); Golub v. Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)
(actress and model). A businessman's wife's sacrifices for her husband's career were
recognized in Meinholz v. Meinholz, 678 S.W.2d 348 (Ark. 1984).
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and were now, to the court's chagrin, claiming shares in the other's
earning capacity.26 If the serviceman's and the executive's spouses
should be compensated, what about the long-term investment of Robert
Lucas' wife in his Nobel Prize in economics? 2 7 If the couple had not
agreed in writing that she would be given a share if he got the prize
during the next five years, she certainly should be entitled to some
claim.
Some might argue that we should give the supporting spouse a share
in the other's enhanced earning capacity to correct incentives disturbed
by no-fault divorce and the ability to leave marriage at will. Spouses
secure in their investment would be more willing to make the sacrifice
that will pay off only in the future, perhaps only after the marriage
has ended. It is also possible, as we will discuss later, that an incentive
to avoid being at fault will be created or strengthened in jurisdictions
where property division is affected by fault. Without any compensation,
we can expect the efficient 28 way of encouraging higher education that
marriage affords to dry up or at least decrease. 29 But this incentive-based
theory suffers from the same criticisms as does an incentive rationale
for alimony:3° it does not present a reason why the degree ought to be
awarded, as opposed to an equitable basis for such an award. This
comparison is not an idle one, for as we have seen already, alimony
and marital property division can properly be viewed as species of the
same thing.31
26. McSparron v. McSparron, 662 N.E.2d 745 (N.Y. 1995). The lawyer husband
argued unsuccessfully that his degree had merged with his practice, since the Juris
Doctor was obtained in the early days of the marriage. The court rejected this view,
noting that his future earnings, unlike the doctor wife's, could be calculated based
upon actual past earnings.
27. See, e.g., Editorial, A Prize Ex-Husband; Divorce Doesn't Doom a Wife's
Stake in a Nobel, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 30, 1995, at A14.
28. At a minimum, a spousal investment avoids the transaction costs associated
with commercial loans. Such a family source of funding may be the only one available
to some poor but promising spouses.
29. The investment in the unit, as opposed to the self, is part of what strengthens
marriages in the first place. Compare Marjorie M. Shultz, Contractual Ordering of
Marriage: New Directions for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 204, 264 (1982), with
Margaret F. Brinig & Steven Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
869, 883 (1991).
30. June Carbone, Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention ofAlimony: A Reply
to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1463 (1991) (commenting on Ira M. Ellman, The
Theory ofAlimony, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1989) which has a strong incentive rationale).
Another critical comment on Ellman is Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital
Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 BYU L. REV. (1991).
31. See Golub v. Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) ("[AIll sorts
of enhanced earning capacity cases are indistinguishable .... There seems to be no
rational basis upon which to distinguish between a degree, a license, or any other
special skill that generates substantial income.").
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Alternatively, one might worry about negative incentives that might
be caused by allowing recoveries in earnings enhancement. Men might
theoretically be less willing to marry if they knew they might have to
compensate for enhanced earnings at divorce.32 My reply begins with
the observation that following the introduction of no-fault divorce, the
marriage rate decreased.33 Saying the two facts are related poses a
post-hoc-ergo-propter-hoc problem. But if other factors, such as rising
wages for women or the trend toward completion of graduate as well as
undergraduate education are factored out, a marked decrease remains.34
Further, women are less happy than in the single state and men are
more happy in late twentieth century marriages.3" Women, then, cur-
rently have an incentive not to marry, since no-fault divorce makes
marriage more attractive for their mates and less so for them.36 Since
both spouses must agree to marry, the decline in the marriage rate
seems likely to be caused by an increasing reluctance of women to tie the
nuptial knot. Allowing spouses' claims in earning capacity (especially
when the marriage has lasted for many years) would seem to make
marriage more attractive to women, thus evening out the incentives
that no-fault has skewed, and leading to an increase in the marriage
rate (at least to the pre-no-fault level).
Thus one possibility is there will be no decline in marriages because
women, who might now hold back, will be more willing to enter mar-
riages. The other, and perhaps equally likely, result is some men will
hesitate to marry because they will have to share their (usually greater)
earning capacity if the marriage fails. The response resembles the retort
when promises to marry became unenforceable. 37 It is, in effect, "good
32. My research assistant, Joel Traylor, suggested this problem.
33. For a recent case in which a sociologist testified about this fact, see Baehr v.
Miike, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996). See also Brinig & Crafton, supra
note 29, at 334 (the authors use multivariate time series regression analysis to focus
on the effect of no-fault divorce). See also H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage and Divorce:
Informational Constraints and Private Ordering, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 437, 443-44
(1986); Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce and Quasi-Rents, Or, "I Gave Him the Best
Years of My Life, " 16 J. LEGAL. STUD. 267, 296 (1987).
34. VICTOR FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY (1988).
35. See, e.g., Lois Verbrugge & Jennifer Madans, Women's Roles and Health,
AM. DEMOGRAPHICS 35 (Mar. 1985). See also Parkman, supra note 10, at 99-101.
Parkman argues in a recent paper that women are working "double duty to protect
against no-fault." ALLEN PARKMAN, WHY ARE MARRIED WOMEN WORKING So HARD?
(Working Paper, Dep't of Management, Sch. of Bus. and Management, U.N.M.,
1996).
36. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Aver-
age, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1993).
37. See Margaret F. Brinig, Rings and Promises, 6 J.L. EcON. & ORGAN. 203
(1990) (discusses the decline of the breach of promise action). For a good argument
for abolition of the related tort of seduction, see Walter Wadlington, Shotgun Marriage
by Operation of Law, 1 GA. L. REV. 183 (1967).
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riddance." If a person will marry only when he can take advantage
of his spouse, the relationship may well not be worth having. Marriage
as an institution exists at least in part to create opportunities for reliance,
investment,3" and sharing.
II. Why Should a Spouse Share in Earning Capacity?
When a couple marries, they share. 39 They take advantage not only
of their mutual affection, but also of savings that are reached because
of a relative abundance of time. This is related not only to the gains
in time when a community moves from hunting to agriculture and
technology improves, 40 but also to economies of scale.4' Usually we
think of the lowered costs of living in one household (or, conversely,
the increase when one household is split into two and scale economies
are lost), 42 but there is also the fact that only one spouse need stay
home to let in the appliance repair person or (in my part of the country)
the exterminator. Time unites these two concepts of the exchange of
alimony and property, and the type of investment that is made when
a couple marries.
In finance theory there is an accepted way in which time relates
"stocks," or capital assets, and "flows," or future earning streams.
According to at least one widely accepted theory, investors price shares
of stock according to the corporation's expected future return, 43 dis-
counted for nondiversifiable risk.44 Differences in opinion among mar-
ket participants about the correct price of stock are resolved through
38. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce,
76 VA. L. REV. 9 (1990); Brinig & Crafton, supra note 29; Cohen, supra note 33.
39. Douglas W. Allen, "What Does She See in Him?" The Effect of Sharing on
the Choice of Spouse, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 57 (1992).
40. A recent best-selling discussion of one such change is THOMAS W. CAHILL,
HOW THE IRISH SAVED CIVILIZATION (1995).
41. For a business school source, see ALFRED CHANDLER, SCALE AND SCOPE:
THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM (1990).
42. Though this proposition seems obvious, a citation is Kujawinski v. Kujawinski,
376 N.E.2d 1382 (Ill. 1978). See also SCHNEIDER & BRINIG, supra note 1, at 971.
43. "Expected return" means the average of all possible returns, each discounted
for its probability. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE:
LEGAL AND EcONOMIC PRINCIPLES 145-46 (1980); POSNER, supra note 11, at § 15.1
& n.l.
44. See RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 137-40 (1981) (describing the Capital Asset Pricing Model, a formula using
expected return, defined as anticipated dividends and appreciation produced by the
corporation, and "beta," defined as market or nondiversifiable risk); Jeff N. Gordon
& Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Re-
search, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 825-27 (1985); Parkman, supra note 10, at 146;
POSNER, supra note 11, at 407-08.
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trading.45 Simply put, those investors who think the price is too low
buy, while those who think the price is too high sell. In this way, the
market reaches a consensus about the corporation's (and the market's)
future prospects, and the trading price of the company's stock reflects
this consensus.
The allocation of time, and its relation to marriage, is in fact the
subject of one of Gary Becker's pathbreaking articles. 46 Becker sees
workers as dividing their time between labor and leisure. They have
only twenty-four hours to divide, and wish to maximize the amount
of leisure they have and also the depth of enjoyment they may have
when resting (for example, access to cruises or cable television). When
one spouse stays out of the job market to raise children or manage the
household, the opportunity cost of the time is what is given up, and
presumably the use of this time in the household is more valuable than
whatever would be gained, financially or otherwise, by that spouse's
remaining in the labor force.47 This is also the reason why married
men with similar qualifications do better in the business world and as
far as health is concerned than do single men. Someone else is supplying
them with the time (and freedom from distractions) to allow them to
perform at their best. A good analogy from the student world is the
45. Assets with the same risk should have the same return. In other words, prices
of assets traded in capital markets should be adjusted by profit seeking activity, called
arbitrage, until assets of equivalent systematic risk have the same expected return.
POSNER, supra note 11, at 405.
Obviously, "trading" cannot occur directly in the marital situation-though that is
perhaps how degrees are "valued" by the couple before the education begins, or at
the time of divorce. The couple contemplating graduate school for one spouse thus
makes what I now refer to as a "side deal." Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone,
The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 TULANE L. REv. 855, 877-82
(1988). As Mahoney put it, "Only monetary contributions made with the mutual and
shared expectation that both parties to the marriage will derive increased income and
material benefits should be a basis for such an award." 453 A.2d at 535.
The Reliance article, but not my shorthand for the concept, refers to the difference
between the lost opportunity to marry another and the lost career opportunities. Trad-
ing-of a less valuable one for one with greater value-allegedly occurs in some Holly-
wood marriages. For example, see Cohen, supra note 33.
46. Gary S. Becker, On the Allocation of Time, 75 EcON. J. 492, 512 (1991);
GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 1145-46 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter
BECKER, TREATISE]. See also Margaret F. Brinig, A Comment on Jana Singer's Alimony
and Efficiency, 82 GEO. L.J. 2461 (1994).
47. Carol Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the
Value of Homemaker's Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101 (1976). It has been estimated that,
on average, the value of the wife's household production is equal to more than 70%
of the household's money (or market) income after taxes, implying that even if she
remains out of the paid labor force, she generates 40% of the household's full income.
Reuben Gronau, Home Production-A Forgotten Industry, 62 REv. ECON. & STAT.
408 (1980).
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residential college, for in college, at least, most housekeeping functions
in a dormitory are assumed by the university (the stay-at-home spouse
surrogate).
Ill. The Validity of a Marital Partnership Claim
Marriage is obviously a complex human activity. Among its other
benefits, it gives spouses a chance to create a family in an atmosphere
of trust and intimacy.48 Less obviously, perhaps, it furnishes security.
The married person enjoys security against the vagaries of the marriage
market. 49 Further, a committed partner who can work if one loses a
job, or who can perform physical tasks if one becomes ill or disabled,
supplies a kind of insurance against illness and unemployment.5 °
Marriage also provides some obvious financial benefits. Having one
household instead of two means one rent or mortgage check, one set
of utility bills and food purchases in larger, less expensive per unit,
quantities. If, as Gary Becker urges, one spouse specializes in managing
the household's finances, car maintenance, or grocery shopping, 5' there
are obvious gains which, of course, may be outweighed by the fun in
doing a joint activity. If the specialization goes further, where one
spouse has primary responsibility for paid employment and the other
for household management, the married people are both making a sub-
stantial investment in their relationship. If, like most couples, they
marry when they are relatively young and beginning careers in the
workplace, there will probably be substantial investments in one or
both careers.52
These investments may be of the obvious kind-one spouse may
finance the other's advanced degree-or may be more subtle. We have
seen two of these less obvious kinds already. One may take the more
flexible job in order to accommodate childrearing or the more prosaic
repair people who need access to the home. One spouse may follow
48. MILTON C. REGAN, FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY (1993);
Margaret F. Brinig, Status, Contract and Covenant, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1573 (1994).
49. PAULA ENGLAND & GEORGE FARKAS, HOUSEHOLDS, EMPLOYMENT AND GEN-
DER 31-42 (1987) (suggest in their chapter on courtship that one assesses a "D"
desirability level and then gets engaged (stops looking) when the best offer seems to
outweigh the probability of getting someone better).
50. This idea is related to that of Dean Professor Scott, who suggested in conversa-
tion that alimony is a kind of insurance against the marriage not working out. Telephone
conversation of August 15, 1996. Marriage in itself furnishes insurance against some
of the other catastrophes possible in life. Gary S. Becker, The Economic Way of Looking
at Behavior (Nobel Address), 101 J. POL. ECON. 385 (1993).
51. BECKER, supra note 46, at 30.
52. Cohen, supra note 33.
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the successful upwardly mobile executive through a series of rotations
across the country or through foreign tours of duty in the armed forces.
The corporate, diplomatic or military career may require substantial
entertaining or relationship-building by the other spouse. Frequently
all these domestic investments take many years to bear fruit. Sometimes,
the obvious alternative to having the other spouse accommodate would
be a commercial loan.
Thus, marriage forms a "firm" in which the couple maximize,
among other things, the total earnings of the firm.53 A greater investment
in one spouse may be optimal for the couple, while such an investment
strategy would be sub-optimal without marriage. For example, without
marriage, both spouses might get college degrees, each earning
$500,000 over the course of their lifetimes. With marriage, one spouse
may well forego the degree while the other earns an M.D. expected
to earn $2 million over the spouse's life. The optimal "joint" strategy
for such a couple during the marriage is for one spouse to stay home
or otherwise assist the other, while the other pursues the doctorate.
This strategy would not be optimal without marriage.
Marriage also signals to the outside world that the married person is
more stable than a single one of comparable age.54 Married people in
their twenties, for example, are typically more conscientious and better
drivers and health risks55 than their single contemporaries. They are
therefore more apt to be lent money or given positions of responsibility. 56
The outsider looking at a married person is more confident (because of
the pattern observed with other couples and singles) that he or she can
afford a nice car, a large home, or a trustworthy position as a manager.
Since the early 1970s, marriage has often been pictured as this kind
of partnership:" one in which contributions are difficult to measure,
but clearly both spouses gain so long as the relationship remains intact.
However, as with many joint enterprises, how to best and most fairly
53. Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on
Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. Cm.
L. REv. 67 (1993).
54. William Bishop, Is He Married? Marriage as Information, 34 U. TORONTO
L. REv. 245 (1984). See also Yoram Ben-Porath, The F-Connection: Families, Firms,
Friends and the Organization of Exchange, 3 Pop. DEv. REv. 1, 6 (1985).
55. See, e.g., Jean Utz Griffin, Marriage, Health, Still a Two-Some, CHI. TmB.,
Nov. 16, 1988, at C8; William R. Mattox, Jr., Even a Nagging Wife is Better than
None, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 5, 1996, at 16.
56. They also earn more than their single contemporaries. See infra note 83.
57. Bea Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails,
68 TEX. L. REv. 689 (1990). See also Rothman v. Rothman, 320 A.2d 496 (N.J. 1974);
Sally B. Sharp, Equitable Distribution of Property in North Carolina: A Preliminary
Analysis, 61 N.C. L. REv. 247 (1983); Singer, supra note 4, at 1117-18; Starnes,
supra note 53.
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compensate the spouses' efforts has proven intractable.58 One obvious
alternative that works in the commercial, but not in the domestic context
is to "pay by the piece," allowing recompense based upon the result
produced. 59 But, a court might find it burdensome to value the better
business relationships forged during a spouse's surprise birthday party,
and impossible to account for the success of children in school or
on the basketball court. 6° A salary arrangement sounds distasteful for
marriage. 6' Economists62 suggest allowing entrepreneurs (again, in the
business context) a share in the profits of a firm gives them the appro-
priate incentives. They put forth their best efforts because they will
prosper as the firm does.63 Without divorce, spouses might love each
other enough to do this anyway. As long as the marital unit remains
intact, and as long as spouses care for each other, the deep hurts caused
by such things as belittling the homemaker's efforts are unlikely to
occur. 64 However, in a world where not all marriages last until death
parts husband and wife, judges and attorneys often must value the claim.
IV. What Is the Nature of the Residual Claim?
A Look at Civil Compensation
Although undertaking marriage entitles one to a residual claim, like
the owner's claim on a firm, several questions remain. The first is
58. The ALI solution, regarding both alimony and property division as facets of
the same problem, of course, resembles the analysis here. The difference is the Tentative
Draft's emphasis on the career opportunity loss side of the equation, rather than the
gain from such an investment. ALI Tentative Draft, supra note 5. In fact, the problem
is similar to the one June Carbone and I analyzed. June Carbone & Margaret Brinig,
Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65
TUL. L. Rav. 953, 957-61 (1991) (discussing forms of civil compensation). I would
award not only for career losses, but also interest on those investments made. In other
words, I would allow the investing spouse to realize some return on whatever has
been contributed to advance the other's career.
59. Ronald W. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, ECONOMICA 396 (Nov. 1937).
Steven N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1983).
60. Custody awards sometimes seem that kind of "payment." But since children
are best off when not viewed as prizes, and themselves are actors needing contact with
both parents in most cases, rewards of this kind aren't practical either. This ignores
the fact that custody of children brings with it responsibility for their care, including
financial responsibility, that may be difficult to fulfill by one single parent.
61. This may be what strikes the reader as wrong in the "Rice Husband." See
AMY TAN, THE Joy LUCK CLUB (1989). Such an arrangement also comes perilously
close to concubinage. On the other hand, is tailoring alimony specifically to the share
of income for the number of years married (or half of them), a more palatable refinement
of the same idea? See Singer, supra note 4.
62. See FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921).
63. Armen Alchian & William R. Allen, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION; COMPETI-
TION, COORDINATION AND CONTROL (2d ed. 1977).
64. See Starnes, supra note 53, Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO.
L.J. 1571 (1996).
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whether the claim is against the other spouse or against the mutual
enterprise, the marital estate. A claim to future earnings is in some
important senses a claim against a person. 65 Clearly the marriage begins
one's life anew at least in certain important respects. Yet the spouses
"take each other" in the marriage ceremony. 66 They make promises
to another person, complete with individual attributes (attractive and
unattractive)67 and education and training.
The spouse is worth more61 if highly educated and properly em-
ployed. Yet, like the entity stock shares represent, the greatest financial
value of such a marital partner lies in the expectation he or she will
do well. 69 The spouse who weds the young graduate of Harvard Business
School pays more and invests more than the one marrying the high
school drop-out pumping gas.7°
Marriage, and even more the conduct following the promise, is par-
ticularly an investment, not just a sacrifice. 7' As investment, the spouses
should be rewarded not only with current purchases and living standards
(the dividends), but also the promise of future income (the capital gains).
We already deal with this troubling feature of the marital investment
(troubling because it can not be predicted with certainty) 72 when we
divide pensions upon divorce. 73 The spouse may not continue to work
65. See ALI Tentative Draft, supra note 5.
66. W. VA. CODE § 48-1-12b (1966).
67. Margaret F. Brinig & Michael V. Alexeev, Fraud in Courtship: Annulment
and Divorce, 2 EUR. J. L. & EcoN. 45 (1994).
68. Allen, supra note 39.
69. PARKMAN, supra note 35.
70. The "payment" may take one of two forms. The first occurs when the spouse
who marries the MBA selects him rather than some other spouse. Presumably she has
some selection of roughly equally talented young men to choose from. To be in this
fortunate position, she must herself be a highly desirable mate. Her opportunity cost
(what she gives up) is therefore higher than the comparable cost of the typical bride
of a gas station employee. Secondly, being married to a highly successful person carries
with it elements of stress, as well as reward, that are part of the price the spouse pays.
71. Compare ALI Tentative Draft, supra note 5, at 10-11:
The approach of the Principles is to refocus the alimony inquiry from need to
loss.. . . The fundamental problem for both alimony and property is determining
when a claim arises-when, in the language of Chapter 5, the potential obligee
has incurred a compensable loss. The choice of remedy-alimony or property
allocation-is essentially a question of implementation and convenience, rather
than a basic principle.
72. See, e.g., DeWitt v. DeWitt, 296 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980):
Whether a professional education is and will be of future value to its recipient
is a matter resting on factors which are at best difficult to anticipate or measure.
A person qualified by education for a certain profession may choose not to practice
it, may fail at it or may practice in a speciality, location or matter which generates
less than the average income enjoyed by fellow professionals.
73. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Michie 1994).
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for the same employer until retirement age because of change of job,
illness, or early retirement. 74 The employer's pension fund may not
do as well as expected at the time of divorce. What some states do in
pension cases is estimate the present value of the pension75 and award
the non-employed spouse some share in it, a share that will be paid at
the future time when the employed spouse begins to receive the annuity.
This procedure should be possible for awards compensating for invest-
ments in earning capacity as well.
The primary objection, just as with the present value award of pen-
sions, seems to be to the extent that we must wait for payment, the
marriage does not end in a "clean break.' ,7 6 Courts cannot predict the
employment future with any accuracy, so they must make adjustments
or modifications in the future.77 As I have noted, some states do this
anyway with pensions (for contingencies controllable or not by the
employee). Besides, as many before me have argued, divorce is not
a clean break.78
V. Why The Clean Break of No-Fault Divorce
Will Not Work
When stock is sold, the present value of current capital and future
dividends are reflected in the stock's price. But divorce does not mean
reentry into something like the stock market. There may be no intent
to remarry, 79 and the success (vel non) of the business part of the
enterprise is necessarily confused with other personal characteristics
such as the working partner's tendencies toward substance abuse, physi-
74. See, e.g., Owen v. Owen, 419 S.E.2d 267 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
75. See, e.g., In re Hobbs, 442 N.E.2d 629 (IIl. App. Ct. 1982); Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 355 S.E.2d 18 (Va. Ct. App. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Michie
1994). See also the Employee Retirement Income Security Program (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1997) (allowing a deferred award of a federal pension). Present
value is discussed infra, note 139.
76. See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 553 A.2d 20 (N.J. 1989); DeWan v. DeWan,
506 N.E.2d 879 (Mass. 1987); Koelsch v. Koelsch, 713 P.2d 1234 (Ariz. 1986). See
generally REGAN, supra note 48, at 143. The "clean break" concept was suggested
in Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CALIF.
L. REV. 291, 313 (1987). See also Ellman, supra note 30.
77. To make up for uncertainty, the stock price will be lower if the risk of no
return is higher. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 44.
78. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 76, at 313; Ellman, supra note 30. For a British
example, see Pamela Symes, Indissolubility and the Clean Break, 48 MOD. L. REv.
44 (1984). For criticism of the clean break concept, see MARSHA FINEMAN, THE
ILLUSION OF EQUALITY (1991); June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family
in Terms of Community, 31 HOUSTON L. REv. 359 (1994).
79. See, e.g., ENGLAND & FARKAS, supra note 49, at 67-68.
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cal violence, or infidelity. There is no immediate and accurate valuation
of the spouse's worth.80
Besides, stock purchase is the quintessential contract at will. Mar-
riage is not, they are what economists call externalities. 81 The state
makes it relatively difficult to exit marriage because the institution itself
has value as the basic building block of society8 2 or as a signal of
the spouses' characteristics, physical and mental 3 and because of its
important childrearing functions.
Most of the time, divorce involves minor children."M Whether or not
we characterize them as unwilling victims of their parents' decision to
separate, they are affected. These effects may be temporary, as with the
emotional or relocation costs of divorce,85 the probable lowered standard
of living, or the immediate loss of a continued parental contact. Children
also lose over the very long-term according to a number of studies. 86 Thus
arguably there can be no clean break when children are involved. The
presence of children makes divorce sticky for another reason. Children
80. Eslami v. Eslami, 591 A.2d 411 (Conn. 1991) (objecting to an award of
goodwill).
81. Definitions of externality include Richard Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation,
85 COLUM. L. REv. 970, 970 (1985). POSNER, supra note 11, at § 8.1; SCHNEIDER
& BRINIG, supra note 1, at 387. Externalities are applied to surrogacy in Margaret
Friedlander Brinig, A Maternalistic Approach to Surrogacy, 81 VA. L. REv. 2377
(1995); June R. Carbone, The Role of Contract Principles in Determining the Validity
of Surrogacy Agreements, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 581, 590-97 (1988). MAXWELL
STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW; READINGS AND COMMENTARY 356 &
n.6 (1996), uses the concept of externality to apply to legislator's behavior.
82. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888); REGAN, supra note 48.
83. Both insurers and employers prefer married over single men. See, e.g., Why
Do Married Men Earn More than Unmarried Men?, 20 Soc. ScI. REs. 29 (1991);
FUCHS, supra note 34, at 88.
84. This is apparently around 60%. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, Child Custody and Child Support, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Special
Series 8 (Series P-23, No. 84, 1979).
85. This may be akin to the structural unemployment when sectors of the market
close down or retool. See, e.g., Jeffrey Parker, Structural Unemployment in the United
States: The Effects of Interindustry and Interregional Dispersion, 30 ECON. INQ. 101
(1992).
86. See, e.g., Barbara Defoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right: Harmful Effects
of Divorce on Children, 271 THE ATLANTIC 47 (1993). For more scholarly accounts,
see, e. g., Mavis Hetherington, Martha Cox & Roger Cox, Effects of Divorce on Parents
and Children, in NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES: PARENTING AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT
233 (M.E. Lamb ed., 1982); Mavis Hetherington, Martha Cox & Roger Cox, Long-
Term Effects of Divorce and Remarriage on the Adjustment of Children, 24 J. AMER.
ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 24:518 (1985); JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA
BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER
DIVORCE (1989); JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLEY, SURVIVING THE
BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980); Judith S. Wal-
lerstein, The Long-Term Effects ofDivorce on Children: A Review, 30 J. AMER. ACAD.
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 349 (1991).
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imply (in nearly all cases) that at least one caretaker must sacrifice leisure
time and employment time for them.87 Losses to the caretaker's career,
whether the children are born early or late in the marriage, are permanent
and estimated at 1.5 percent of total future earnings per year out of the
job market.88 If flexible employment must be accepted following divorce
because, for example, there is not the money to hire a full-time nanny,
the loss accepted during the marriage (at the time the child is conceived
or born) continues after divorce. 89 The analysis made thus far completely
ignores the need for ongoing contact between divorcing parents to ac-
commodate child support and visitation. These necessary (and, from the
child's perspective, overwhelmingly desirable) connections 90 also pre-
clude any clean break. The more involved the parents remain the better
as far as the child is concerned. 9'
One of the reasons both for investment and against a clean break is
the kind of role the parents' relationship plays in their child's upbring-
ing. Ira Lupu refers to this in the constitutional language of balancing,
or separating, powers. 92 One parent restrains the other who may act
too hastily or too much out of self-interest and therefore harm the
87. To this extent I completely agree with Martha Fineman. Martha Fineman,
Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REv. 2181
(1995). See also GARY BECKER, TREATISE, supra note 46, at 43:
Specialization of tasks, such as the division of labor between men and women,
implies a dependence on others for certain risks. Women have traditionally relied
on men for provision of food, shelter and protection, and men have traditionally
relied on women for the bearing or raising of children and the maintenance of
the home.
88. Saul D. Hoffman, Divorce and Economic Well-Being: The Effects on Men,
Women and Children, DEL. LAW. (Spring 1987) (suggests that 40% of the wage gap
between men and women may be due to such reductions). See also Donald Cox, Panel
Estimations of the Effects of Career Interruptions on the Earnings of Women, 22 EcoN.
INQUIRY 386 (1984); Thomas D. Oldham, Putting Asunder in the 1990s, 80 CALIF.
L. REv. 1091, 1108 & n.82 (1992).
89. Thus, I disagree with the ALI Tentative Draft, supra note 5, which counts
only sacrifices made during the marriage itself.
90. See, e.g., Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn. 1996). See generally Karen
Czipanskiy, Child Support and Visitation: Rethinking the Connections, 20 RUTG. L.
J. 619 (1989).
91. Ira Lupu, Mediating Institutions: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction: The
Separation of Powers and the Protection of Children, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1317 (1994);
Yoram Weiss & Robert Willis, Children as Collective Goods in Divorce Settlements,
1 J. LAB. ECONS. 15 (1985); MARGARET F. BRINIG & F.H. BUCKLEY, JOINT CUSTODY
AND SOCIETY (Working Paper, George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law 1996). On the positive
aspects of consensual solutions to dissolution problems, see Robert H. Mnookin &
Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950, 956-57 (1979); Marjorie Schultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage;
A New Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204, 264 (1982).
92. Lupu, supra note 91.
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child. I like to think in the economic terms of complementarity. 9 In
childrearing terms, one parent functions as the right shoe, the other
the left.94 Both are necessary, but they do different things. The same-sex
parent may act as role model plus disciplinarian or provider or chauf-
feur. The opposite-sex parent may educate the child in how best to
deal with the opposite sex in future relationships and may also instill
morality, or secure medical care, or coach the soccer team. Child
rearing, thus, is a joint productive activity of the marriage. 95
As others have written before, 96 developing the atmosphere in which
the joint enterprise can flourish most often requires an unequal, uneven,
sharing of the unpaid work.97 The lack of protection for the homemaker,
particularly, has caused a spate of articles suggesting pension protec-
tion, equal division of assets,99 and changes in the tax code.'0 None
of these ideas necessarily conflicts with the premises of this article,
and perhaps a combination of them will prove most satisfactory for
eventual legislative activity.
Implementation of shared earning capacity involves answering sev-
eral questions. If marriage, at least in part, is an investment by the
spouses in each other's earning capacity, the decision maker on divorce
has to answer several questions. First, the court must decide exactly
93. MARGARET F. BRINIG, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY ch. 4 (forth-
coming 1997).
94. Complementary goods are those that are both necessary for some productive
activity. Another example is tennis balls and tennis racquets, both needed to play the
game. HAL VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 103 (1987). When the price
of one good declines, there will therefore be more consumption of both. Think, for
example, of what happens to sugar consumption when coffee prices decrease.
95. It should come as no surprise that the Catholic marriage service includes
children as an important factor, and canon law as an important ingredient in a sacramen-
tal marriage. See, e.g., William Morrisey, Proposed Changes in Canonical Matrimo-
nial Legislation, 20 CATH. LAW. 30 (1974).
96. Carol Bruch, supra note 47; Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A
Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
97. PARKMAN, supra note 35; W. Keith Bryant, The Family and Technology, 20
HUM. ECOLOGY FORUM 11 (1992); Cathleen D. Zick, & Jennifer Geurer, Family
Compensation and Investment in Household Capital: Contrasts in the Behavior of
Husband-Wife and Female-Headed Households, 21 J. CONS. AFFAIRS 21 (1987); Cath-
leen D. Zick, & Jennifer Geurer, Trends in Married Couples' Time Use: Evidence
from 1977-78 and 1987-88, 24 SEX ROLES 459 (1991).
Carol Rose suggests that the greater altruism of women in families justifies some
sort of "leveling" reimbursement on divorce. Carol Rose, Women and Property:
Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV. 421 (1992).
98. Gillian Hadfield, Households at Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies to Rem-
edy the Gender Gap, 82 GEO. L.J. 89 (1994); Mary O'Connell, On the Fringe:
Rethinking the Link Between Wages and Benefits, 67 TULANE L. REV. 1421 (1993).
99. Bruch, supra note 47; Starnes, supra note 53.
100. Staudt, supra note 64.
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what sort of investment was made: how much of a spouse's career
stems from pre-marriage training and experience, and how much from
growth during the marriage. 0' As we have already mentioned in pass-
ing, a way to approach this problem is to look at the wage rates of
people generally. In most occupations, a person is hired at a relatively
low wage, works for a number of years acquiring the skills necessary
to be most productive for the employer, and works at peak nearly until
retirement. '0- The increase in wages over this life of employment comes
from at least two factors: the need to keep pace with inflation, which
is tied to "efficiency wage" theory,' 03 and the need to pay the worker
his or her marginal product of labor, 1°4 which increases during the
lifetime work cycle.'0o In other words, as the human capital the em-
ployed person brings to the task increases, the wage rises. The differ-
ence between the wage increase and the rate of inflation is presumably
due to the increase in the employee's human capital.
The second resembles the award of future earnings as part of a work-
men's compensation 1°6 or wrongful death claim:'07 what is the expected
value of the spouse's future career? The addition made during the
marriage will be a fraction of this total expected value.' 08 The third
question depends upon the state's general property division laws and
whether there is a presumption or requirement of equal division.' °9
Further, the fact that one spouse studied or went to endless meetings
101. As we have noted, some economists see the investment as quite a small one,
but I would argue that it is far larger. See, e.g., PARKMAN, supra note 10, at 147.
102. See, e.g., ENGLAND & FARKAS, supra note 49.
103. See, e.g., ANDREW WEISS, EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS: UNEMPLOYMENT,
LAYOFFS, AND WAGE DISPERSION (1990). Efficiency wages are the amounts paid by
employers to keep valued workers performing well on the job. They must be higher
than what the workers would receive either through unemployment compensation or
through the job they would likely obtain if fired.
104. The marginal product of labor is the amount added to total output resulting
from the employment of an additional unit of labor.
105. FUCHS, supra note 34.
106. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983). See
also American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, 683 P.2d 670 (Cal. 1984)
(upholding California's medical malpractice act).
107. See, e.g., Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Ageloff, 552 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 1989); STUART
M. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 2d (Lawyers Co-op 1975). For a
present value table as it appears, see id. § 8.4. See generally Michael T. Brody,
Inflation, Productivity, and the Total Offset Method of Calculating Damages for Lost
Future Earnings, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 1003 (1982).
108. PARKMAN, supra note 10, at 147.
109. States requiring equal division include: California, CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550
(West 1994); Louisiana, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801(4)(b) (West 1983); New
Mexico, Michelson v. Michelson, 520 P.2d 263, 266 (N.M. 1974). Wisconsin, among
other states, presumes it. See also ALI Tentative Draft, supra note 5, § 4.15; Herma
Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE REFORM
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while the other worked or provided relief from household chores
0
may arguably give the student or manager a greater share. There may or
may not be other assets that can be offset against the earning capacity. I"
Finally, as with pensions, payout need not occur until the time the
income is actually realized, so it could be adjusted in case of illness
or injury or involuntary unemployment. 2 An earning capacity is just
like any other asset, so that the investor-spouse should be compensated
for contributions to the other's career.
Before we conclude our thoughts, we need to address the role
fault should play. The idea that fault should count probably stems
from the same confusion between alimony and property division that
permeates the whole inquiry. "3 In many states, fault is relevant for
the court granting alimony. 114 Fault may be relevant for historical
reasons,"' but more likely is considered because of the claim on
future earnings alimony represents." 6 Property involves contribu-
AT THE CROSSROADS 6, 13 (Steven Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay, eds. 1990). But
some states reject even the presumption. See, e.g., Rothman v. Rothman, 320 A.2d
496 (N.J. 1974).
110. See, e.g., Mullen v. Mullen, 49 S.E.2d 349 (Va. 1948). The husband, a
self-proclaimed genius at chemistry, worked seven days a week, ten hours a day during
World War II and afterwards, leaving the wife and their daughter at his parent's
spacious Richmond home.
111. Graham v. Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978). Weitzman, supra note 13
(finding that in most modern marriages there were few other assets).
112. Risk-adjustment at the outset, while in some ways more certain, fixes the
earning spouse in a way that many think undesirable. Advocates of the mechanism
are Daniel D. Polsby & Martin Zelder, Risk-Adjusted Valuation of Professional Degrees
in Divorce, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 273 (1994). The fact that property awards cannot be
modified is noted in DeWitt v. DeWitt, 296 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1980) ("Unlike
an award of alimony, which can be adjusted after divorce to reflect unanticipated
changes in the parties' circumstances, a property division may not.") (citing old Wis.
STAT. § 767.32 (1977)).
113. Separating the two made complete sense historically:
Alimony has never been defined here by statute; but, from the beginning, it has
never been considered, as in some States, as a division of property. It "is a
maintenance afforded to the wife, where the husband refuses to give it, or where
from his improper conduct compels her to separate from him. It is not a portion
of his real estate, to be assigned to her in fee simple ... but a provision for her
support, to continue during their joint lives, or so long as they live separate."
Wallingsford v. Wallingsford, 6 H. & J. 485, 488 (Md. 1823).
114. The ALl Principles' Reporter's Notes lists 30 states where fault plays at least
a minor role in the granting of alimony. ALI Tentaive Draft, supra note 5, at 61.
115. For further discussion, see, e.g., Courson v. Courson, 129 A.2d 917 (Md.
1957). For a list of cases, see 34 A.L.R. 313, 321 (1954).
116. See, e.g., HOMER CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES, § 16.1, at 621 (2d ed. 1988) ("Alimony continues the support which the wife
was entitled to receive while the marriage existed."). Clark cites Dayton v. Dayton,
161 S.W.2d 618 (Ky. 1942); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 124 N.E.2d 485 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1954);
Bray v. Landergren, 172 S.E. 252 (Va. 1934).
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tions that are more akin to "sunk" or historical costs 7 where subse-
quent fault would not seem to play a role. In fact, fault only plays
a role in property distribution in eighteen states, compared to the
thirty that consider it for alimony." 8
In the days before property distribution, a husband who earned
money as the family breadwinner and titled purchased assets in his
own name got to keep "his" property even if he was also a philan-
derer or an alcoholic or a spouse abuser.'9 His homemaker wife,
who had no claim to the property, might have a claim to a portion
of his post divorce earnings (as alimony), not so much because she
had earned them, but because she was not at fault in ending the
marriage. Thus the question of whether fault should "count" proba-
bly can be answered most usefully by looking to existing state prop-
erty division law. Most states do not consider fault in distributing
property, as it is currently defined. Since I argue that earning capacity
is just another form of property, courts should consider the same
factors in making these awards.
VI. Conclusions
Now we return to the questions posed at the outset, hopefully with
some answers. The first was why the young professional's spouse might
get some share in the newly acquired career while the young military
officer's will not. The answer here may lie in the fact that it is middle
class litigants themselves who have set the professional degree cases
apart from others involving other career enhancements. I suspect,
though, that family lawyers have not, to date, argued all these cases are
about the same thing: whether earning capacity enhanced by marriage
117. If decisions today are made in terms of opportunity cost, that is, to commit
resources to one activity as opposed to another, cost is the value of "the road not
taken." Decisions by economic actors rely upon predictions about the future, not upon
past events. Past outlays (unless they affect prospective costs) are not costs because
they exert no influence on current decisions.
Thus, when the tenured professor gives up his secure job in order to follow his wife
to another part of the country as she pursues a more attractive job opportunity, his
opportunity costs (his tenured salary) are "sunk." If, some years later, when he has
only been able to secure employment without tenure, he commits marital fault, the
opportunity costs of the original decision remain the same. He still has lost the expected
value of the tenured salary. The question is whether the new decision (whether or not
to desert or commit adultery, say) also should take into account the consequences of
the original one.
118. ALl Tentative Draft, supra note 5, at 61.
119. CLARK, supra note 116, § 16.1, at 619 (citing Cooke v. Cooke, 2 Phill. Ecc.
40, 161 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1812); Otway v. Otway, 2 Phill. Ecc. 109, 161 Eng. Rpt.
1092 (1813)). For a more modern case where the husband squirreled away the money
he earned while his wife's was used to support the family, see Feidler v. Feidler, 55
D.L.P. 397 (Alberta App. 1978) (but the wife committed a marital offense).
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should be treated as a marital asset. 120 They may not have argued for
including enhancements to earning capacity because this requires a
fairly sophisticated set of calculations. However, these are not much
different from those the contemporary divorce lawyer must frequently
make anyway. If, on the contrary, she was most or equally to blame
for the marriage's demise, she could not claim entitlement to a share
in his earnings. 121 In fact, alimony was like an entitlement in the Robert
Reich "new property' ' 2 2 sense: it came not because earned, but be-
cause the benefits were expected.
If we now claim, as this article argues we should, that enhancements
to earning capacity made during marriage are just another form of
marital investment, why should they be subject to the fault rule any
more than was the tangible property purchased by the errant husband
of old? It is clearly easier to see why fault should not play a role where
the investing spouse has actually put money into the other spouse's
business or paid for his education. It is harder to see why it should
not matter if the contributions are the more subtle, service-based ones
of the homemaker who entertains or irons shirts at the same time she
drinks in secret or entertains the postman or the famous photographer. '
23
Perhaps there is moderate-range difficulty with the wife who quits her
high paying job to accommodate her husband's career (or their child)
and then develops, out of boredom or frustration, a drinking problem. 1
24
In fact, we might break the fault cases into four representative catego-
ries:
1. Career-enhanced spouse was at fault, but the fault was irrelevant
to the enhanced earning capacity 125;
120. WEITZMAN, supra note 13, at 109 (sagely pointing out that human capital
(enhanced earning capacity) is the "diamond" among the other marital jewels).
121. Fault thus served to identify those cases in which one party had so flouted his
or her marital duties that the other deserved to be released from the duties of a relation-
ship that had effectively ceased to exist. J. BIsHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON MARRIAGE,
DIVORCE AND SEPARATION § 1452 (1891). See also Franklyn C. Setaro, A History of
English Ecclesiastical Law, 18 B.U. L. REv. 1021, 1021-23 (1938); MAX RHEINSTEIN,
MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LAW (1972).
122. Robert Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
123. Thus the wife in the motion picture The Bridges of Madison County had already
earned her share in her husband's farm when she was involved for four days with the
photographer. She resumed faithful performance of the marital duties immediately
afterwards and continued her performance for the rest of her life.
124. For a similar example, see Mullen v. Mullen, 49 S.E.2d 349 (Va. 1948) (wife
ultimately deserted the husband).
125. See, e.g., O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin, 458 S.E.2d 323 (Va. Ct. App. 1995)
(husband's infidelity had a negative impact on the well-being of the family); Crump
v. Crump, 1993 WL 445358 (Va. Ct. App. Sept 7, 1993)
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2. The career-enhanced spouse was at fault and the fault was relevant
to the accumulation of earning capacity or wealth 126;
3. The working spouse was at fault, but the fault was irrelevant to
the investment in the other's career127; and
4. The working spouse was at fault and the fault was relevant to
the enhancement of the other's career. 128
It would seem that the fact most states have recognized 29 fault should
play a part only if relevant, as in cases two and four, to the accumulation
or dissipation of marital wealth.
Does a fault-based division between alimony and property make any
sense, given no-fault divorce? Not really. If earning capacity is most
couples' greatest asset, and alimony ceases to be a private welfare
system based on need, then doctrinally there is little difference. States
may have to readjust their rules about modification and such things as
exemption from bankruptcy 30 if earning capacity awards are put into
the current "property" rubric, rather than becoming, as the ALI has
suggested, part of "compensatory spousal payments.'
' 3
'
Reimbursement for lost career opportunities plus a share in the cou-
126. See, e.g., Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 396 S.E.2d 675 (Va. Ct. App. 1990)
(husband made enormous sacrifices for wife that diminished his own career opportuni-
ties).
127. See, e.g., Stallings v. Stallings, 393 N.E.2d 1065 (111. App. Ct. 1979) (wife
brought most of the money into the marriage, supported the family, and took care of
husband's six children from a prior marriage, while the husband dissipated much of
her estate through a series of "business misadventures"); Smith v. Smith, 331 S.E.2d
682, 687 (N.C. 1985) (wife used alcohol to excess and deserted husband and children.
Husband, a retired military officer, helped wife obtain her Master of Library Science
degree, and at the time of divorce earned $9,800 compared to her $11,000 per year).
See also Carbone & Brinig, supra note 58, at 1004 & n.214, case 1.
128. See, e.g., Westbrook v. Westbrook, 364 S.E.2d 523 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
129. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2602 (West 1996); Burtscher v. Burtscher, 563
S.W.2d 526 (Mo. App. 1978) (husband committed adultery at the time of separation;
wife played bingo over her husband's objection four nights a week during the marriage);
Chalmers v. Chalmers, 320 A.2d 478, 483 (N.J. 1974); Blickstein v. Blickstein, 472
N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Peirson v. Calhoun, 417 S.E.2d 604, 606
(S.C. Ct. App. 1992); Aster v. Gross, 371 S.E.2d 833 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
130. Alimony and child support are typically exempt; property division is not. See,
e.g. In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983); 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(D) (1996);
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3592 (West 1996). See generally Sheryl Scheible, Defining "Sup-
port" Under the Bankruptcy Law: Revitalization of the "Necessaries" Doctrine, 41
VAND. L. REv. 1 (1988).
131. ALI Tentative Draft, supra note 5, § 4.07(1), at cmt. a notes:
Section 4.07 provides that spousal skills and earning capacity are not divisible
property. An increment in spousal earning capacity during marriage therefore
creates no property claim. Relative earning capacity is nonetheless relevant at
divorce because it can give rise to a claim for compensatory payments.
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pie's tangible property is only sometimes fair compensation. 13 2 It will
only be sufficient when the lost career opportunities approximately
equal the gain to the other's enhanced career, plus interest (the ordinary
rate of return). '3 3 Sometimes the "investing" spouse may not have lost
much, if anything, in terms of career potential.'34 Should such a fortu-
nate person nonetheless be given no reimbursement for an investment
to the other's career? Sometimes the amount sacrificed will exceed the
amount gained. 135 My argument here, unless there are large sums in
other assets to spread around, is that in these cases the presumptive
amount (the expected value of the career enhancement) may be modified
if the income that eventually comes in is, through no fault of the benefit-
ted spouse, lower than expected. 1
36
We have already noted the objection that allowing for distribution
of enhanced earning capacity may prolong ties between people who
are legally free to pursue separate lives. Such continued relationships
may be avoided if they can agree the expected value of the enhancement,
like property, cannot be modified in the future, 37 discount this amount
to present value, 138 and transfer the sum at the time of divorce. If the
132. This is the suggestion made in the ALI Tentative Draft, supra note 5. It seems
to form some of the basis for the award in Mahoney, and, more explicitly, for that
in DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); Haugan v. Haugan,
343 N.W.2d 796, 803 (Wis. 1984) (the court fears that anything but calculation of
the expected stream of income may give the student spouse a windfall and fail to
recognize the supporting spouse's expectations). For a criticism of the ALI proposal,
and an alternative suggestion of a more technical nature (relating earning capacity to
acquisition of annuities), see ALAN KOCZELA, VALUING ADDITIONS TO A SPOUSE'S
HUMAN CAPITAL FINANCED BY THE MARITAL ESTATE (working paper, George Mason
University Department of Economics, 1996).
133. We are thus back to the discussion of Fuller and Perdue made in Brinig &
Carbone, supra note 45. Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)
(interest was in fact awarded).
134. This was true of Ms. Graham and Mrs. Gagliano, both of whom ended up
with nothing despite their work to further their husbands' careers. Graham v. Graham,
574 P.2d 75, 78 (Colo. 1979); Gagliano v. Gagliano, 211 S.E.2d 62 (Va. 1975). Mrs.
Inman was able to recover her investment in her husband's degree despite her own
career. Inman, 578 S.W.2d at 266.
135. See Srinavisan v. Srinavasan, 396 S.E.2d 675 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (the wife,
a perpetual student, did not gain tenure at her university, and therefore had to forego
her career as an academic. Her husband, meanwhile, had made substantial sacrifices
in terms of his own academic advancement).
136. Such a fault might be a voluntary unemployment, or the deliberate choice of
a nonlucrative career. See, e.g., Antonelli v. Antonelli, 409 S.E.2d 117, 119 (Va.
1991); Matter of A.I., 435 N.Y.S.2d 928 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1981).
137. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109 (Michie 1994) (alimony, now maintenance and
support).
138. Discounting to present value requires that the decision maker calculate how
much a sum today is likely to appreciate over the future (when the full amount would
be due). The present value for a $300 payment to be made in three years, expecting
3% interest, is $300 + (1.03 x 1.03 x 1.03) = $282.86.
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risks are assumed in the computation of present value, the enhanced
spouse has the "average" incentive to work hard. This begs the question
of whether people who divorce are in fact average in terms of their
work ethic and risk-taking propensities. 39 Of course, to the extent the
investing spouse relies on delivery of payments in the future, he or
she is tied to the other's earning capacity. There may be no other
alternative if there are few other assets from which a present value
award can be made. 4° The working spouse's share may be like the
equitable lien favored by community property states for occasions in
which one spouse invests in the separate property of the other. 141 Some
states might decide to have payments made directly from the employer
of the spouse who benefitted. Perhaps, more controversially, the idea
that the relationship can be neither easily nor cheaply discarded will
cause some spouses to work a bit harder on their marriages. 142
These questions do not account for all cases where compensatory
payments ought to be made. There may well be investments in children
that do no more than hold both spouses' earnings on an even keel. 143
Marriage, after all, is not just about, or even mainly about, creating
wealth in the financial sense." There may also be career moves for
139. For a suggestion that they may in fact be more risk-seeking and entrepreneurial,
see Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, The Market for Deadbeats, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 201, 221 (1996).
140. This is an argument for deferring receipt of pensions even though immediate
payment of the share's present value may be preferable. See, e.g., In re Nelson, 746
P.2d 1346 (Colo. 1987); Pulliam v. Pulliam, 796 P.2d 623, 626 (Okla. 1990).
141. For an example of how the equitable lien works in the family law context,
see Robinson v. Robinson, 429 N.E.2d 183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (Wife and husband
made improvements on property that belonged to the husband's parents. Upon their
divorce, husband and wife had an equitable lien on the property and could force a
sale.). See generally Joan Krauskopf, Theories of Property Division/Spousal Support:
Searching for Solutions to the Mystery, 23 FAM. L.Q. 253 (1989).
142. For example, see G.K. Chesterton, The Superstition of Divorce, in IV COL-
LECTED WORKS (1987).
143. Both Ira Ellman's Theory, supra note 30, and the ALI Tentative Draft, supra
note 5, provide for children.
144. To return to my students, this seems one of their primary objections to BECKER
TREATISE, supra note 46. See Brinig, supra note 37. See, e.g., Wisner v. Wisner,
631 P.2d 115, 123 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981):
[I]n the absence of such an agreement, we believe it is improper for a court to
treat a marriage as an arm's length transaction by allowing a spouse to come into
court after the fact and make legal arguments regarding unjust enrichment by
reason of the other receiving further education during coverture. In the absence
of a specific agreement, such legal arguments simply do not fit the context of a
marital relationship. In each marriage, for example, the couple decides on a certain
division of labor, and while there is a value to what each spouse is doing, whether
it be labor for monetary compensation or homemaking, that value is consumed
by the community in the on-going relationship and forms no basis for a claim of
unjust enrichment.
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lifestyle purposes (for example, to a teaching career from practice, or
to a climate more suitable to an allergy sufferer) that make the marriage
better off but do not make sense from a money-in-the-pocket stand-
point. 145 In any case, the resulting fairness among divorcing couples
(middle class versus those who are not) and among the spouses them-
selves (between career enhancer and career-enhanced) certainly seems
worth the effort.
145. These would not be compensated under Ellman's Theory, supra note 30, re-
stricted to career sacrifices for economically rational reasons. But see Jennifer Roback,
Wages, Rents and Amenities: Differences Among Workers and Regions, 26 EcoN.
INQ. 23 (1988).
